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2Abstract
Callon’s (1998) ‘performativity thesis’ encourages us to consider how the boundaries of the
economy are negotiated. This paper explores one such discussion: the contributions of
economics to the debates over the introduction of markets for transplant organs. The paper
pays particular attention to the normative aspects of economic valuation. It examines the
philosophical antecedents of economic contributions to the debate, notes the rhetorical and
linguistic power of economic calculation and then focuses on three distinct sets of
calculations concerning the value of a transplant kidney: a contingent valuation calculation, a
risk-premia based calculation, and a cost-efficiency simulation. In each case, it shows that
economic facts, once created, may travel freely through normative debates and claim moral
force. The technical process of economic modelling is therefore seen to be a crucial aspect of
the economisation of this area, and of economic performativity more generally.
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3Introduction: economising organs
The growing literature of ‘performativity’ (Callon, 1998) argues that the economy is a
socially negotiated and bounded arena, and that it is ‘embedded’ in economics, a discipline
with distinct historical and political objectives (Cochoy, Giraudeau & McFall, 2010). How,
then, are the boundaries of the economic negotiated? While the adoption of economic
valuation within hitherto ‘social’ spaces has been studied at length by, for example, Viviana
Zelizer (1979; 2005), such studies have concentrated on the organisational and cultural work
involved in the process of economisation, and have tended to ignore the technicalities of
valuation. Work on more technical aspects of valuation (Çalışkan & Callon, 2009:389)  has 
focused the construction of economic agents and institutions, rather than the battles between
competing realms of value. Empirical studies of valuation have either focused on areas that
are self-evidently economic – for example MacKenzie’s (2006) study of the performative
nature of options pricing theory – or have been content to recognise that an economic mode
of valuation has been imposed as part of a political project – for example, Holm’s (2007)
account of the economisation of the fishing industry. The present paper bridges that gap by
considering the role of technical economic valuation in the highly contested economisation of
one particular area: the procurement of organs for transplantation. It examines the ability of
economics to appropriate, on the basis of technical expertise and its attendant moral claims,
contested or ethically fraught aspects of social life. The paper pays particular attention to the
rhetorical power of economic reasoning (McCloskey, 1986), and to the linguistic aspects of
performativity (Ferraro, Pfeffer & Sutton, 2005); it offers a complement to the devices-and-
organisation account of economic performativity in organ transplantation offered by Steiner
(2010). In concentrating on the linguistic and rhetorical aspects of economic performativity,
particularly in the context of boundary-setting, it is also possible to draw parallels between
4the performativity research programme and cultural studies of economization (Zelizer, 1979;
Zelizer, 2005).
This paper argues that the boundary of the economic is negotiated through border skirmishes:
fiercely contested linguistic and calculative interventions, laboratory experiments to
determine the ‘natural prices’ that might exist in the wild and their likely consequences
(Tryggestad, 2005). These interventions have power enough to transform the world around
them from the fulcrum of the laboratory (Latour, 1988) and are therefore an important topic
for scrutiny. I follow the methodological injunction of the performativity program in
investigating how such discussions are embedded in the everyday activities of economics,
here calculations, surveys and simulations. I examine the arguments concerning the
introduction of markets for the procurement of transplant organs, many of which took place
in medical and economic journals throughout the late 1990s and early part of the following
decade. I explore a series of interventions from academic economists seeking to argue, on
economic grounds, for the moral permissibility, the practical cogency, and the organisational
superiority of market-based systems. The paper will show that technical, economic ‘facts’
come to have moral force and figure large in the debate between contesting regimes of
valuation. These facts – numbers and prices – are created through models and simulations
and subsequently travel through arguments of differing kinds. Freed from their history, they
recast ‘moral’ discussions terms of efficiency and best price. The use of incentives for organ
procurement remains for the moment illegal, and the models stay firmly in the laboratory.
Even there, the models and techniques of economic theory are deeply performative, asserting
the basic axioms of instrumental, utility-maximising rationality.
5The paper will begin by setting out the theoretical claims of the performativity thesis in more
detail and considering the normative content of applied economic analysis, suggesting that
economics is able to argue ‘ought’ from ‘might be’: that calculations have their own moral
force. I develop this argument by reviewing in detail three sets of economic calculation of the
value of a transplant kidney: a contingent valuation calculation, a calculation based on risk
premia and the statistical value of life, and a cost-efficiency simulation. In each case I show
that economic facts are constructed, claim moral force, and come to dominate a discussion
previously had in philosophical terms. The article then discusses and concludes, offering
suggestions for future research.
Ought from might be: the moral performativity of economics
The performativity thesis (Callon, 1998), said to be ‘the most challenging recent theoretical
contribution to economic sociology’ (MacKenzie & Millo, 2003:107), represents the claim
that economics is a socially constitutive theory with the moral and technical authority to
organise the world in particular ways. Economic valuation ‘performs, shapes and formats’
(Callon, 1998:2) institutions and organizations. Sustained by repeated use of economic
practices, valuations and calculations, they are the ‘summing up of interactions through
various kinds of devices, inscriptions, forms and formulae’ (Latour, 1999a: 17). Material
entities instantiate economic theory in organizational settings without transforming the
‘economic representations or beliefs’ of those involved (Steiner, 2010:249). In the field of
organ transplantation, for example, Steiner is able to show that the introduction of organ-
swapping mechanisms built upon notions of gift-giving (Roth, Sönmez & Ünver, 2005)
‘performs’ surgeons’ activities without their direct cognizance of the complex relations of
gift-exchange.
6Despite an emphasis on the material aspects of market arrangements, the linguistic
component of performativity also remains important (Licoppe, 2010). Economics provides a
technical vocabulary that can compete with other social or moral discourses for claims on the
organization of social structures (McCloskey, 1986), disentangling and framing calculative
activity (Callon, 1998; Ferraro, Pfeffer & Sutton, 2005).1 Debates over economising organ
transplants are based on facts, and, as Latour (1999b) shows, facts have a career and a
history. Created as locally valid artefacts in specific settings, they are universalised as facts,
and enrolled in subsequent advances and debates; ‘the career of a fact tends to make the
history of its production vanish’ (MacKenzie, 2009: 9). Economic facts are created by
modelling, and while this is often unstable and contested, the offspring of the models cut
loose from their origins and travel, unquestioned, into subsequent models and debates. In
particular, as this paper will show, economic facts may be deployed in debates that have not
previously been economic in nature, entering the preserve of moral theorists and radically
changing the nature of the debate. It is the ability to reframe the debate thus, to recast the
terms of argument into economic measures, to discard some goods and emphasise others, that
makes the language of economics performative.
To some extent, the ground has already been prepared for the incursion. Economics, with its
focus on individual choice, shares an intellectual heritage with contemporary bioethics.
Gerald Dworkin (1994:155) makes autonomy the basis for an elegant and robust defence of
organ sales. In accepting the legitimacy of organ sales, he argues, we recognise the autonomy
of individuals, their sovereignty and ownership of their body parts, and their right to make
choices about how others treat their body. The right to choose forms the basis of the
arguments in defence of organ markets offered by the philosophers James Taylor (2005) and
1 The notion of performativity itself owes a debt to philosopher of language JL Austin (1978)
7Mark Cherry (2005) who are prepared to defend markets against charges of exploitation
through poverty (Scheper-Hughes, 2003): ‘Removing what the poor may see as an attractive
option, so as to assuage feelings of repugnance on the part of the affluent, itself coercively
limits the liberty of the poor autonomously to assess available opportunities to better their
lives’ (Cherry, 2005:84).
Autonomist arguments shade easily into economic commentaries. It is possible, for example,
to talk of an impoverished individual turning physical capital (organs) into a more productive
human capital by selling an organ and spending the funds on education (Barnett, Saliba &
Walker, 2001:379). Cherry’s language, too, is unashamedly that of neo-classical economics:
‘If an organ market would best utilize the available organ resources, or would best maximize
benefits for persons, these factors would be sufficient to make a market morally
acceptable…’ (Cherry, 2005: 70). The test, as he admits, is how we should calculate benefits,
and he is full of suggestions of what the market, as a space of possibility, might do: markets
would allow the purchase of organs for the poor (ibid: 102); church fundraisers would sell
their own organs for charity (ibid: 78); a poor man may consider organ sale an honourable
and positive solution to financial problems (ibid: 84). Supporters of the market assert that it
generates its own ethical standards, laws of ownership and stable relationships; the common
intellectual ancestry of autonomist moral philosophy and neoliberal economics allows the
narrative of one to segue neatly into the other. Moreover, the allocation of scarce resources is
a core disciplinary interest for economics. Papers invariably begin with a statement of the
scarcity of transplant organs, illustrating this with a comparison of waiting list figures versus
the actual number of transplants performed, or organs available. The very existence of
scarcity seems to be enough, in itself, to legitimize economic intrusion into a debate that
otherwise concerns medical practitioners and moral philosophers (Roth, 2007). In other
8instances, such as the construction of non-monetary clearing houses for transplant organs
(Roth, Sönmez & Ünver, 2005) economists may perceive that their special skills may be of
service to the medical community.
It is equally likely, however, that economics colonizes the topic out of a sense of disciplinary
superiority, just as it has aggressively engaged with other ethically charged, non-market
issues. Becker (1973) established a framework for analysing marriage as a market, offering a
justification for the work derived from the approach of Milton Friedman’s ‘positive
economics’ (Friedman, 1966). Becker introduces the topic as a clear act of imperialism,
another step in economics’ journey towards producing ‘a unified framework for all behaviour
involving scarce resources, nonmarket as well as market, nonmonetary as well as monetary,
small group as well as competitive’ (1973: 814). Successful analysis of the marriage market
presented ‘compelling additional evidence on the unifying power of economic analysis’ (p.
814); in the best tradition of imperialism, the virtues of colonization are demonstrated
through action. The subjugated natives of sociology and philosophy will see the virtue of
economics’ disciplinary incursion, clearly and in retrospect.
Yet the concept of performativity reminds us that the analysis offered by economists is not
devoid of normative content. The description of a social process as a market performs it (in a
strictly Austinian sense) as a market. Demonstrating that a functioning market might have
certain beneficial effects in principle carries a strongly normative claim that such a market
should be enacted in practice. Economic analysis moves seamlessly into social commentary.
In fact, as I will show, the economic literature on markets for transplants is rich explicitly
normative content. The debate hinges on a substitution of technical expertise for moral
competencies; as Alvin Roth remarks, ‘it does seem true that when confronted with
9repugnance towards a market transaction, economists often respond as if a sufficiently clear
argument focused on the welfare gains due to trade will overcome that repugnance’ (Roth,
2007: 49). Economics does indeed deduce ‘ought’ from ‘might be’, and so the endeavour of
economic theory must be to demonstrate that ‘might be’ might indeed be: that a market could
and would function. The complex set of moral questions surrounding organ markets has
become explicitly empirical: let the modelling commence!
Making an economic fact: the price of an organ
In order to show that markets will function in a socially useful manner, economists must
model supply and demand or attempt to arrive at hypothetical prices by other means. In
particular, to deal with standard policy objections, economists must show that the use of
incentives will not ‘crowd out’ altruistic donations, and that appropriate prices will generate
sufficient demand to have some social impact (Adams, Barnett & Kaserman, 1999). The
economic literature on organ markets offers a variety of strategies in pursuit of these prices,
and in this section I will review three such. In each case we can witness the career of the fact
(Latour, 1999b): the modelling which results in a price; the severance of that price from the
often questionable and arbitrary circumstances of its birth; and the utilisation of the fact as it
travels into other models, discussions, and arguments. In each case it is possible to determine
the process that Tryggestad (2005) terms ‘purification’, the expunging of unstable, non-
economic factors (here moral and social concerns) to establish a ‘natural’ price. As
Tryggestad notes, the natural price has enormous power and is capable of rendering other
market actors into ‘docile servants’ (Tryggestad, 2005:603), and something of this kind is
discernible in the arguments discussed below.
10
The first natural price, or economic ‘fact’, stems from the work of one particular group of
welfare economists writing in the mid to late 1990s, and who explicitly brought the methods
of welfare economics to bear on the problems presented by markets in transplant organs.
These economists wished to demonstrate the social welfare benefits that might flow from the
legalisation of markets for organs. In the absence of legally available price data they needed
to hypothesise and model the likely supply and demand curves for a market. In this case, the
demand schedule appeared to be straightforward: with transplant operations a cheap
alternative to prolonged dialysis, analysts may reasonably assume that insurers and health
services will continue to fund the purchase of an organ, irrespective of price fluctuations. In
order to establish supply these economists made use of the contingent valuation method
(CVM), where individuals are surveyed and asked their willingness to pay (WTP) to obtain a
good and willingness to accept (WTA) to forfeit the good. The supply curve may be
statistically derived from their answers. Adams et al. (1999) are the first to hazard an
estimate of the incentive needed secure a contract for future donation. They conduct a survey
of students at Auburn University to establish the WTP and WTA for a posthumous donation;
their results indicate that supply would be very responsive to incentives, with a price of
$1,000 per donor clearing the market (Adams, Barnett & Kaserman, 1999: 154), and leading
a ‘relatively trivial’ price per organ. This equilibrium price is inferred from the modelled
supply schedule on the basis of donation levels in 1996.
The words ‘statistically derived’ hide much, however, and researchers who wish to pay
attention to the complex arrangements that surround the birth of a fact need to linger over
Adams et al.’s method a moment longer. The CVM is popular among environmental
economists who cannot empirically access prices for the goods in which they are interested. It
has been useful in attempting to model the demand schedule for clean air (Wellington &
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Whitmire, 2007) and also features in high-stakes legal proceedings, for example when firms
are prosecuted for environmental damage (Portney, 1994). It is based upon the assumption
that an individual may derive ‘utility’ from the existence of something, such as a natural
landscape, without ever seeing or using that thing. Moreover, it assumes that the appropriate
method of valuing any ‘utility’ is an economic one: the survey respondent is constituted as an
individual agent and is asked to express a set of preferences through the dispersal of an
imaginary budget. The respondent is then assumed to be maximising and representative of the
relevant group (Mitchell & Carson, 1989). It is therefore explicitly performative in the sense
that it imposes an economic mode of valuation upon participants and attempts to reduce a
range of concerns to a price function.
Economists recognise that contingent valuation methodologies are problematic in terms of
their ability to inform policy (Portney, 1994). Respondents tend to overspend, splashing
hypothetical money on hypothetical goods, and WTP estimates remain high (Diamond &
Hausman, 1994; Park & MacLachlan, 2008). For other goods, particularly public goods with
‘degenerate’ utility functions, WTA values tend to be much higher than WTP values, as
individuals take a stance against the property rights implied by the survey method (Mitchell
& Carson, 1989). Discrepancies between WTP and WTA value are recognized as more than
methodological artefacts; there are deeper issues hidden within the calculations as economists
struggle to purify social relationships and nonmarket factors from prices. In this particular
case, there is an asymmetry of permission at the centre of Adams et al.’s survey. While
students were asked the smallest amount they would be willing to accept to grant permission
to have their (or a relative’s) organs harvested at death, they were asked the largest amount
they would be willing to pay to prevent their organs from being removed, ‘assuming that an
organ procurement organisation had the right to collect their organs without permission and
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in the absence of such a pre-death agreement’ (p.152, my italics). Respondents were being
polled not only on their attitudes to organ donation, but also implicitly surveyed on their
views on self-ownership and bodily integrity; it is easy to imagine that the most enthusiastic
organ donor might balk at the prospect of forced retrieval without permission. High WTA
estimates have been linked to ‘protest’ answers to surveys, and it is plausible here that
respondents’ resistance to a perceived violation of bodily integrity might lead to a similar
outcome in WTP values.
For a class of Auburn sophomores, the exercise of pricing their own demise must have been
particularly hypothetical. The problems with WTP become apparent in another,
methodologically identical, CVM calculation (Wellington & Whitmire, 2007), which
suggests that the equilibrium price of cadaveric kidneys would be prohibitively high.
Wellington and Whitmire are concerned that the survey methods used by Adams et al. were
inadequate in terms of the reliance on undergraduates as a survey sample, and due to the
possibility of anchoring bias (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), where a limited range of values
on the survey instrument forced WTP and WTA estimates downwards. Their study replicates
Adams et al.’s survey, but collects responses from a broader and older population. Their
results show a slower uptake at the same incentive levels than do Adams et al. so that an
incentive of $100 produces a national supply of 12,378 kidneys for Adams et al. and just
8,963 for Wellington and Whitmire. In itself, this is an important finding, as Adams et al.
have made much of the price responsiveness of organ donation; in the second survey, every
dollar has much less purchasing power and prices are higher. But the most important finding
of Wellington and Whitmire’s study is to show the sensitivity of any proposed equilibrium
price to changes in underlying data: the recalculated equilibrium value in 2003 was $1.2
trillion. Compare Adams et al.’s $280 (sic: two hundred and eighty dollars!); if live donors
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(unpaid) were incorporated the equilibrium prices are $144,216 and $18. The clearing price
was so high, Wellington and Whitmire reveal, because the WTP (the amount that people
would pay to avoid forced retrieval after death) did not respond well to financial incentives.
Some gave the ‘protest’ answer of zero: this survey population held clear opinions that
financial incentives could do little to shift, and many reject the notion of economic value and
exchange in this context. A third, more recent and yet more sophisticated, CVM-based study
(Altinanahtar, Crooker & Kruse, 2008) produces a price range from negative, in the case of
high-income 35 year old females who would donate altruistically, to $1,800 expected by low-
income 21-year old males. For some members of the population, financial incentives are
actually counter-productive.2
The natural prices of economists are far from certain, and in these laboratories they can be
seen to cling to the circumstances of their production. Yet they still manage to exert
enormous technical power over competing moral claims, and so Wellington and Whitmire
argue that their study has a twin purpose: not only to demonstrate the importance of
appropriate data and survey instruments, but also to make a political argument for the
inclusion of non-incentivised live donors in incentive systems. Not at any point do these
arguments stop to consider the complexity of decisions that are being reduced into the proxies
of WTP and WTA, nor indeed the issues of incentive-driven cadaveric procurement sitting
alongside a live donation system. Instead, the writers concentrate on the technical problems
relating to data selection and treatment and philosophical questions become explicitly
empirical.
2 On this point, economic modelling corroborates classic anthropology (Titmuss, 1970; Healy, 2006)
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Altinanahtar and colleagues also draw our attention to a serious problem not tackled in the
original paper. Contracts for the posthumous use of organs effectively create a futures
market, where the crucial factor is usability: only those individuals who die suddenly and
before their time, often through accident, become high quality donors, while a further group
may provide lower-quality, extended criteria donors.3 If 6% of all deaths result in a usable
cadaver, then donation will satisfy market need. At 3% usability, the cost of contracts will be
$4,000, while below 3% usability there is inelasticity in supply from cadavers and the market
cannot be satisfied. There are, in other words, factors beyond the control of supply and
demand curves. The actual physical supply of cadaveric organs through appropriate and
often untimely deaths might have the consequence of rendering a market unworkable: it is
when the economic arrangement established by prices ‘leaves its sheltered laboratory
existence for the world...that formerly confined uncertainties begin to overflow’ (Tryggestad,
2005:605)
Methodological issues apart, Adams et al.’s demonstration that the prices of cadaveric
donation are trivial sets the tone for subsequent debate. It is probably helpful that the
valuation arrived at is a round number: $1000. Once established, this $1000 quantitative
artefact (in the sense that it is replicable only in the local conditions of Adams et al.’s
experimental setting) slips its chains and begins to travel. As a ‘fact’ it becomes of value as a
tool in subsequent economic-ethical debate. Sometimes, this is not subtle. It allows Clay and
Bock (2002) to proclaim an end to illegal traffic and murder; a well-functioning cadaveric
market is held out as a strong ally of those opposed to live vending, as the trivial rewards
available will deter vendors (Kaserman, 2005). But the existence of an economic fact allows
aspects of the debate that would otherwise elude economists to be dragged into the realm of
3 I ignore the ethical ramifications of a futures market in human organs.
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economic valuation. For example, in a dispute between Emmanuel Thorne and the
Barnet/Kaserman (BK) group, the issue of altruism versus sale is debated in purely economic
terms: cost versus effectiveness. Thorne (1998), begins by setting the cost of exhortation (i.e.
of encouraging new donations) per new organ at $1,650, and emphasises the efficiency of
exhortation over payment. After many calculative flourishes, BK suggest $10,102 as a more
appropriate price for exhorting a kidney;4 more expensive than the ‘trivial’ cost of a
purchased kidney. The conclusion of this argument is, of course, that we should buy kidneys
through a market mechanism; the technical argument has a moral force.
These discussions demonstrate how economic models produce prices that are pure,
disentangled (Callon, 1998) from their roots in social settings and moral contexts. And yet,
once this is done, the prices immediately assume moral force. Economic models are highly
normative; they are performative both in their assembly and in their consequences. The
practice of science demands a nesting of proofs and facts, allowing investigators to move
forwards on the basis of established knowledge (Latour, 1999b). In the same way, economic
facts, once constructed, support further calculative activities, a process shown in the
following two examples. The arguments reviewed above have focused on the less-contentious
topic of incentivising cadaveric donations, assuming that an adequate potential supply will
keep prices down and so preclude live organ vending. But Becker and Elias (2007) produce a
highly calculative argument in favour of live organ vending as a means of ameliorating the
current waiting lists for kidney and liver transplants. Despite a significant change in the range
and content of ethical arguments opened up by a sudden switch from cadaveric to live organ
vending, Becker and Elias devote their efforts to developing a new and even more
sophisticated means of setting a price on transplant organs.
4 The alert reader will have noticed an increasing specificity of estimation on the part of these writers: $1000,
$1,650, and finally $10,102.
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Becker and Elias’ calculation assumes that the ‘reservation price of an organ has three main
additive components: a monetary compensation for the risk of death, a monetary
compensation for the time lost during recovery, and a monetary compensation for the risk of
reduced quality of life’ (Becker & Elias, 2007:9). The last of these proves difficult to assess,
and is accorded a ‘generous’ (i.e. arbitrary) $7,500 value. The second is calculated on the
basis of a month’s lost earnings for an individual earning $35,000. The first component,
compensation for a risk depends on a particular set of calculations known as the ‘value of
statistical life’ (VSL), pioneered by Mishan (1971): the ‘money premium required to bear a
small increase in the probability of death…estimated empirically in many studies from risky
market activities that involve trade-offs between money and fatality risks’ (Becker & Elias,
2007:10).5 On the basis of these calculations, Becker and Elias estimate that a sum of $15,200
would elicit sufficient donations from US residents to clear the market. Liver donation is a
more risky procedure, with a longer lay-off and a larger quality of life impact: the necessary
incentive per liver would therefore be $37,600.6
Becker and Elias’ calculations are not constructed from the ground up, but make use of
calculative methods already well-established in health economics, using risk premia
expressed by the VSL. The VSL does not need to be unpacked, examined, or recalculated,
but simply forms one of the foundations for an exercise in moral economics. It is also
noticeable that the sophistication of the methods in some parts of the calculation hides
5 Symmetrically, ‘an individual’s ‘value of statistical life (VSL) is her marginal rate of substitution between
survival probability and wealth – the rate at which she is willing to make exchanges between monetary wealth
and small changes in survival probability. For example, someone who would pay $1,000 to eliminate a one-time
fatality risk of 0.0001 would have a value of statistical life of approximately $1,000/0.0001 = $10m’
(Bergstrom, Garratt & Sheehan-Connor, 2009:1316).
6 If these prices seem low, it is worth remembering that in the case of analyses based on risk premia, for
example for dangerous work, prices are determined by the most risk friendly or economically disadvantaged
members of the populace (Kelman, 1981).
17
arbitrary decisions taken in others: the generous compensation for a reduced quality of life,
and the choice of $35,000 as the income level against which compensation for lost earnings
should be gauged. The calculations might look quite different had they been based upon the
salary and expectations of leading economics professors! Nor, indeed, are we alerted to the
many controversies inherent in the reductive nature of the VSL and its many assumptions
about the commensurability of risk, money and human life (Fourcade, 2009). As with the
CVM described above, the analysts have gone to great lengths to establish a market price for
an organ that purges it of ethical and social issues in order to organise a debate on economic
lines.
Both the CVM and Becker and Elias’ calculation are abstractions, designed to simulate prices
in the absence of their practical context. Another approach might be to integrate the
calculations within the existing infrastructure of healthcare economics in the field. Such a
method, exemplified by Matas and Schnitzler (2004), falls within the project of ‘economists
as engineers’ (Roth, 2002), relying on algorithms and game theoretic reasoning rather than
abstractions of supply and demand. Matas and Schnitzler examine the cost savings that a
transplant might bring about and so establish the maximum that a buyer might pay. Dialysis
is more expensive than a transplant and substituting one for the other saves $94,579 over a 20
year period, in addition to which a quality of life adjustment drives the total cost-saving to
$269,319. As all donors would have to be paid, the payment per donor would vary, and
would depend also on the size of the eventual pool accumulated: Matas and Schnitzler
eventually settle on a societal break even figure of $90,000 per donor.
Matas and Schnitzler’s argument is more interesting for its calculative apparatus than its
eventual valuation of a kidney. The transplant/dialysis question is understood as a process
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with five outcomes and a return loop from cases of graft failure to the waiting list. The
process is modelled with factors including ‘patient survival, cost on dialysis, graft survival,
death with function, death after graft loss, cost of organ acquisition, cost of transplant,
maintenance costs with graft function and cost of return to dialysis’ (Matas & Schnitzler,
2004). Like the other calculations discussed, this model makes use of existing measures;
unlike those calculations, the measures used are already operational in medical organisations.
Some, such as measures of graft survival probabilities of death are statistically derived from
historical records. Others, such as cost of acquisition of the organ transplant, reflect the
systems of costings and payments that necessarily exists in the bureaucratic organisation of
health services. In the highly marketized healthcare system of the US, where Matas and
Schnitzler are writing, organ procurement organisations are able to recoup acceptable
expenses and an entrepreneurial industry of procurement has sprung up (Anteby, 2009) with
cadavers accruing economic surplus as they travel from donor to eventual recipients in
scientific laboratories and operating theatres (Healy, 2006). In national health services such
as the United Kingdom’s NHS, internal markets are harder to discern yet equally ubiquitous:
surgeons in well-equipped central hospitals must bid for surgery time and resources on the
basis of expected returns from those local health authorities whose patients are treated.
The problems of allocation of resources, and of commensurability, are exemplified by the
Quality Adjusted Life Year (QALY), a standard measure central to Matas and Schnitzler’s
argument. The QALY is a standardised and widely adopted measure that allows healthcare
professionals to allocate resources appropriately (Phillips, 2009). Not only does the cost-
utility score allow administrators to ascertain the relative efficiency of treatments relating to
similar conditions; it also allows administrators to allocate resources between otherwise
incommensurate medical conditions on the basis of cost-utility (Mortimer & Segal, 2008).
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The wide use and the implications of the QALY as a performative market device have
already been recognised (Sjögren & Helgesson, 2007). Matas and Schnitzler assume that the
QALY for transplants is the same as for dialysis, and thus calculate the long term opportunity
cost of dialysis. A transplant organ, they suggest, is worth both the present and future cost
savings that it generates; in making this claim, Matas and Schnitzler’s argument extends an
existing instrumental managerial discourse of cost efficiency to its conclusion. Economics is
seen here, not as a hypothetical modelling of market processes, but a genuine extension of
existing managerial practice.
This section has considered three differing sets of calculations presented in economic and
medical journals, all of which seek to justify the implementation of market-based systems for
the procurement of organs for transplantation. In each instance, the arguments hypothesise a
system of organisation that has been entirely subjugated to economic modes of valuation, and
operate within this to produce valuations according to economic methodologies. These
valuations may then be used as the basis of discussions as to the validity of a given system of
organisation. Where this point is not made explicitly, and the calculations are presented as a
simple exercise in the positive economics of human behaviour, it remains a small step to
move from an instrumental to a normative set of arguments. I have shown throughout this
section how such a step might be made, with economic simulations containing implicit moral
claims based on the economic virtues of cost efficiency and social welfare.
Discussion: performing value
In this way, a collection of economists, surgeons and economically minded philosophers have
attempted to impose a regime of economic value on the current arrangements for supplying
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organs for transplantation. M theoretical framework for discussion is Callon’s (1998)
‘performativity thesis’, the claim that economics actively constitutes and bounds the
economy. Callon proposes an anthropology of valuation, investigating the economic
configuration of individual calculative agencies and the setting of the boundaries of the
economic (Callon, 2008; Çalışkan & Callon, 2010). I propose that ‘contested’ markets are 
particularly rich areas to investigate, emphasising the normative content of economic
evaluations and giving a glimpse into an economic laboratory as yet uncontaminated by ‘the
wild’.
In the examples discussed, the rhetorical force and linguistic power of economics
(McCloskey, 1986) are most apparent. The very possibility that a debate over transplant
organs can take place in economic language is itself performative, taking the argument from a
terrain populated by discourses of moral obligation and worth into one arranged by a
particular set of economic values. Economic values are parsimoniously expressed as
numbers: expressions of preference contained in price. While economists have engaged with
the ethical debate in superficial ways, in their accounts the real work of ethical reasoning is
done by economic calculation and quantification. In this, economics has the support of
philosophy; as Cherry (2005) notes, the real test of autonomist ethics comes in the calculation
of benefits. Health economic measures such as the QALY may contain some notion of the
good life, but this is philosophically unsophisticated at best (Brock, 2001). Yet economics has
provided a sophisticated technocratic discourse that has allowed a moral sphere to be
analysed and discussed in a particular way. Laboratory interventions develop ‘natural prices’,
such as the $1000 cadaver, which travel and colonize future debates. As Tryggestad (2005)
notes, natural prices are powerful actors, transforming other actors into docile servants. Those
who do not organize their activities on economic lines – surgeons and healthcare
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professionals, who may have other practical or ethical agendas, are accused of rent-seeking
(Barnett, Beard & Kaserman, 1993).
As Bauman (1989) argues, the replacement of moral with technocratic responsibility is a
sleight of hand characteristic of modern organisations; the rational organ vendor seems a long
way from the individuals upon whom ethicists and anthropologists focus, driven by altruism,
love or economic desperation to surrender part of themselves for an organ transplant. Cost-
savings analyses and demand side calculations bear little resemblance to the everyday
activities of surgeons, discerning consumers who discard one of every two transplant organs
that pass through their hands (Howard, 2002). The key authors in the debate, experts in
antitrust, regulation and microeconomic policy, view these complex issues in terms of
inefficiency, waste, and market distortion (Kaserman & Barnett, 1991). Just as philosophical
arguments need to be answered in philosophical terms – rights, autonomy and the goods of
life – so calculative economic reasoning may only be countered by more calculation. An
economised moral argument must be heard on economic grounds, governed by the goods of
economics: efficiency, social welfare, liquidity and transparency. As we have also seen
demonstrated by the wide range of prices and values conjectured, ‘all the mathematical
sophistication and rigour that may go into the modes of computation may be undermined by
the arbitrariness of the choices to adopt one principle for quantifying rather than another’
(MacIntyre, 1992 :186), a phenomenon that appears to go unrecognized by the analysts
themselves. Yet even among enthusiasts for a market, methodology may not be everything;
the elegantly constructed prices offered by Becker and Elias do not seem to have achieved
such autonomy as the thousand dollar cadaver.
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Echoing Steiner (2011), I propose that the topic of markets for transplant organs provides an
important site for the study of economic performativity. It is the task of researchers
investigating this site to unravel and document the interactions between economic theory and
the world through which social and organizational structures are performed (Holm & Nielsen,
2007). Methodologically, these interactions must be sought through a close study of the
calculative techniques and discourses called into play. This paper has documented some of
these techniques. As economists have attempted to explore the functioning of these
hypothetical markets we have seen calculative tools of great sophistication deployed to
ascertain the monetary value of medical treatments, of years of life, and of the transplant
organs themselves. In the first two cases we saw a process of ‘purification’ (Tryggestad,
2005) where laboratory methods were employed to produce ‘natural’ prices, free from the
messy constraints of bodies, relationships, and social norms. Calculations are underpinned by
the assumption of instrumentally maximising rationality in vending or donating individuals;
as Bergstrom et al. pithily put it, ‘a rational potential donor whose choices are consistent with
a von Neumann–Morgenstern utility function’ (Bergstrom, Garratt & Sheehan-Connor,
2009:1323). The very methods that are used to generate such prices are performative in their
own right, demanding that respondents act as economic agents in situations where
instrumental rationality may not necessarily occur. At the same time, it is possible to discern
in the inelasticity of the supply curve a resistance to economic incentives; as models strive to
frame and purify the economic decision, they generate resistance and moral quandary. As
Callon (1998) makes clear, economic frames are persistently unstable and overflowing.
Actors may deploy the very tools that economists have forced on them, offering prices that
protest against the economic norms implicit in, for example, survey prices. A reframing, and
further purification, requires all direct participation to be removed, replaced instead by the
preferences inferred by Becker and Elias (2007) from national datasets. Cultural studies of
23
economization, such as Zelizer’s work on insurance (2005), have shown that cultural
discourses themselves shape practices as economic. In the case of organ transplantation,
debates among academics and professionals strive to establish the norms of economic
agency. A performativity-inspired analysis must move beyond culture and language to focus
on the technical minutiae of economic life, for as I have shown, language itself is reflexively
bound up with the material models and methods that bring economic practices into being.
The moral consequences of performativity are important. Callon (1998) emphasises the
ability of markets to disentangle social relationships and leave both parties in a transaction
satisfied and uncommitted. An altruism-based live liver transplant program running in
Scotland had resulted in just one transplant in the course of 18 months: the recipients, it
seems, considered the procedure too dangerous for their spouses and siblings to undergo7.
Recasting such a decision to a structured and uncommitted market exchange runs the risk of
obliterating the distinction between manipulative and non-manipulative social relations
(MacIntyre, 1981) at the very time when such distinctions are most needed. In giving us an
understanding of the socially constitutive role of economics, the performativity thesis allows
us to ask the question: what kind of world would we like to inhabit? Some twenty years after
the original paper by Adams et al., the debate remains current. In 2011, the Nuffield Council
for Bioethics published its consultation on human bodies in research, a discussion of the
legitimacy of using incentives to increase supply of transplant organs, the efficacy of such
measures considered beyond discussion.8 A persistent focus on incentives and supply
obscures the social and political questions that stand behind ballooning waiting lists:
problems of diet and obesity, the distribution of wealth in contemporary society, and the
ethical issues concerning the use of advanced surgical techniques as routine treatment.
7 Seminar: Ronan O’Carroll, Social Dimensions of Health Institute, Dundee University, 4 February 2011
8 Nuffield Council on Bioethics (2011) Human Bodies: Donation for Medicine and Research, London
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It remains to indicate where future research may usefully be directed. This article has argued
that the language and models of economics are powerful enough to contest, or even change,
the shape of public discourse over transplantation. It is imperative to extend the study to the
pragmatics of the retrieval and allocation of transplant organs. The relationship between
economic theory and everyday practice is far from straightforward in any area, and is
especially complex in medicine. Economics’ laboratory-made constructions of price come
under pressure when released into the wild. In the case of transplant organs we know that
much of the infrastructure for a calculative and utilitarian approach to organ retrieval and
allocation is already in place. The economic surplus accrued by a cadaver during the
transplantation process has an unavoidable impact on the organizations that handle it
(Anteby, 2009). In the United States, increasing numbers of hospitals have set up transplant
units in order to avoid sending their retrieved organs elsewhere and to capture their share of a
lucrative market (Mahoney, 2000:185). Advanced surgery is expensive and resource
intensive, and as my analysis notes, quantitative infrastructures are important determinants of
the availability of treatment. Meanwhile sociological and ethnographic studies of organ
collection show an activity rich in meaning and symbolism (Sharp, 2006). There is, therefore,
a need for qualitative research with a specific focus on the impact of the calculative apparatus
of economics on surgical practice in this area. A research project inspired by a material
sociology would base this examination on the micro-level processes of calculation:
algorithms and procedures, and their impact on day to day medical practice. It should also
investigate the relationship between accounting practices and organizational arrangements in
the transplant sector, as accounting offers stability and visibility to economic modes of
valuation.
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Transplantation is a technique at the forefront of medical science, enabling surgeons to give
the very sickest a new lease of life. Because of this, it is necessarily at the forefront of
medical ethics also, presenting us with questions that we could barely have imagined 50 years
previously. While just a part of the broader spectrum of moral issues that transplantation
entails, the role of economics remains important and is likely to be of vital area of study for
scholars of markets in coming years.
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